時論廣場》中美第三次高層對話 兵棋推演系列6：AUKUS曝臺矛盾點（方恩格Ross Darrell Feingold）

美、英、澳三國組成AUKUS防衛聯盟，聯盟的首項重大計劃是協助澳洲建造8艘核動力潛艦。(圖/美聯社)

此次《中國時報》主辦的兵棋推演模擬美、中兩國可能發表聯合聲明，且兩國高層在即將到來的G20峰會上對談之情境，筆者在參與此次精彩的兵推過程中，看見了幾個臺灣必須謹慎思量的問題。

首先值得一提的是，舉辦此次兵推活動的數小時後，澳洲、美國和英國宣佈了其針對中國所聯手簽訂的「AUKUS」安全協議。兵棋推演的主辦方在選題上本已準備充分，爲此次推演設計了許多可能影響雙方談判的變因與考量，但也難以事先預料到現實中會出現「AUKUS」這樣的聯合安全協議。若在此次兵推的議題討論中納入此安全協議，整個討論的風向可能會大幅轉動，美中雙方領導人直接對話的可能性將大大減低。

結合現實來說，臺灣政府是否能在第一時間獲得這樣的國安相關情報，對於臺灣在國際間的生存至關重要。以此次兵推爲鑑，若臺灣政府在當事國公開對外宣佈「AUKUS」之前已能掌握此情報，便能及早推演出更切實際的美中對話情境，進而權衡臺灣在其中的位置。

此消息一出，似乎也讓臺灣政府措手不及，在臺灣境內反核的同時，卻一面熱切歡迎澳洲核子潛艇來臺灣附近海域巡防。這說明了臺灣政府在此議題上並未準備好一個適切的迴應，產生了自相矛盾(dichotomy)。

第二個看點是美國在中美聯合聲明中提到臺灣議題時所慣用的語彙。儘管中國對川普政府及部分拜登政府近來在臺美關係正常化的許多舉措表達不滿，但美國無論是在單邊或雙邊公開聲明中的措詞始終符合其一中政策的標準框架。

至於在美臺的雙邊聲明中，近來出現一些越來越細緻的措詞來指涉美國與臺灣之間關係強度的增長，但美國在對中國的聲明中目前爲止，並未出現過突破性或挑戰中國的字眼。

第三，臺灣確實被中國視爲核心利益，但當我們從臺灣角度來看美中關係時，容易因爲抱持着過高的期待，而忽略了臺灣只是美中雙方諸多分歧與不同意見的衆多議題之一，因此我們常會看到臺灣出現在美中聯合聲明的篇幅，並沒有像臺灣媒體所期待的比例來得大。有許多關心臺灣的人經常過度戲劇化描述臺灣在美中談判桌上的地位，例如外媒最近刊登的臺灣是國際間戰略和經濟的一個大彩蛋，這對臺灣的現況實在沒有幫助。在筆者看來，臺灣應該注意，避免過度膨脹自身的重要性（develop an inflated sense of its importance）。

第四，我們若仔細檢視此次美中高層對談中，拜登政府的國安團隊人員，便能發現其中主要是政治任命的官員組成（而非職業外交官），這些人通常的立場會是對中方抱持正面態度，也就是希望與中方展開接觸與對話，而並非與中方交惡。這是典型的民主黨與（和拜登總統的）自由開放派外交政策風格。無論是在阿富汗、伊朗還是臺灣問題上，拜登政府通常表現出願意與另一方對話的開放態度，這也是造成有些人會質疑他的外交政策缺乏審慎性（prudence）。

最後，在這次兵棋推演過程中，無論是美中雙方對於臺灣、香港、新疆、南海、中國「一帶一路」、貿易衝突，或人權議題上抱持分歧意見，雙方至少都同意美中領導人應該要在G20會議進行直接對話。然而我們必須要考慮到，這樣的中美高層會面對臺灣的風險在於，即使拜登公開表示他擔心中國對臺灣武力威脅，拜登仍然極有可能再度重申美國將堅守一中政策，並強調不會與臺灣建交，或與臺灣結成軍事同盟。

爲了臺灣的利益與政治考量，臺灣政府經常譴責臺灣的政治人物與中國官方安排任何會面，筆者認爲臺灣政府也應該口徑一致，向外國政府傳達同樣的信息。（作者爲美國共和黨海外部亞太區前主席）

全文：

Simulation Once Again Reveals Risk for Taiwan

By Ross Darrell Feingold

Former Asia Chairman Republicans Abroad

The recent simulation hosted by China Times at which the two sides attempted to reach the modest goal of issuing a joint statement and arranging a meeting for President Joe Biden and President Xi Jinping to meet at the upcoming G20 summit once again revealed several truths that Taiwan must humbly confront.

First the exercise occurred hours prior to the announcement by the Australia United Kingdom and United States about their new AUKUS security alliance directed at China. The exercise organizers did an admirable job of introducing breaking news events to the exercise that might affect the negotiating positions of the two sides and the outcome of the exercise. Neither organizers nor participants could anticipate the AUKUS announcement but had it occurred shortly before or during the exercise the dynamics would be significantly different. The likelihood that the two sides could issue a joint statement or agree to a leaders meeting would have been significantly reduced. This demonstrates that in the real world for Taiwan the ability to obtain intelligence about national security related developments is crucial to its survival. Although we can speculate whether Taiwan was aware of AUKUS prior to the public announcement the likelihood is that Taiwan was unaware and had to react after the announcement just as other governments in Asia did.

The dichotomy of Taiwan’s government which opposes the domestic use of nuclear power welcoming the possibility of nuclear-powered Australian submarines patrolling the waters near Taiwan indicates that the Taiwan government did not have a response prepared beforehand.

Secondly in negotiating the language of a joint statement it was no surprise that with regard to Taiwan each side insisted on the usual language that China and the United States typically use when issuing statements following bilateral meetings. This wording is standard in such statements notwithstanding China’s displeasure at the many actions to normalize U.S. – Taiwan relations taken by the Trump Administration and more recently to some extent by the Biden Administration. But even if the United States sometimes makes minor adjustments to this wording ultimately in unilateral or bilateral public statements with China the United States continues to make the usual references to the Taiwan Relations Act and the United States’ One China policy.

Although bilateral U.S.-Taiwan statements usually refer to the strength of the relationship in ever-more elaborate words a breakthrough for how the United States is willing to describe its relationship with Taiwan when making unilateral statements or joint statements with China is yet to be achieved.

Third although Taiwan remains a core interest for China Taiwan was one among the numerous issues that both sides discussed and sought to include in the joint statement. Certainly the Chinese side had many issues about which it wanted to express its disagreement with United States policies. Similarly the United States also had numerous issues it wanted to discuss. When looking at U.S.-China relations and specifically the issue of Taiwan in the context of U.S.-China relations from our vantage point in Taiwan we often make the mistake of forgetting that Taiwan is one among many issues in the U.S.-China relationship. Taiwan is not the only issue China wants to discuss in bilateral meetings and thus there is limited time in discussions or space in joint statements for Taiwan. It does not help that well intentioned foreign friends of Taiwan often dramatically refer to Taiwan using descriptions as a foreign media report recently did that Taiwan is an immense strategic and economic prize. In this author’s view Taiwan should be careful that it does not develop an inflated sense of its importance.

Fourth the United States team which consisted of political appointees and not career diplomats attempted to maintain a positive attitude and engage with the Chinese side rather than break off discussions. This is consistent with the typical Democratic Party foreign policy (and President Biden’s) style. Whether the issue is Afghanistan Iran or Taiwan the Biden Administration willingness to talk with the other side will continue to fuel critics concerns about the prudence of its foreign policies.

Finally the two sides very much wanted to arrange a meeting at the upcoming G20 between Presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping. At least in the simulation no issue appears to prevent the desire to meet whether Taiwan Hong Kong Xinjiang the South China Sea concerns about China’s actions along the Belt and Road or in the Pacific trade disputes or human rights in China. Such a meeting is risky for Taiwan because even if Biden states concerns about China’s threats to use force against Taiwan there is a likelihood that Biden will also reiterate that the U.S. will adhere to its One China policy and will not establish diplomatic relations or enter into a military alliance with Taiwan. If Taiwan’s government thinks it is risky for Taiwan politicians to meet with Xi Jinping for the sake of consistency and to protect Taiwan’s interests it can consider to openly deliver the same message to foreign governments too.